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Defined as a set of distinct processes that included the declining use of large psychia-
tric institutions and the increasing use of outpatient services and general hospitals,
deinstitutionalization occurred earlier in Saskatchewan than other provinces in
Canada. It was led by a CCF government dedicated to major change across a
number of sectors including mental health, assisted by one of the most influential
and well-organized social movement organizations of the 1950s, the
Saskatchewan Division of the Canadian Mental Health Association (SCMHA).
However, by the late 1950s and early 1960s, the SCMHA opposed the CCF govern-
ment’s policy priority on medicare which it felt came at the expense of mental health
care, in particular the implementation of a regional psychiatric hospital system
called the Saskatchewan Plan. As a consequence, the SCMHA, once such a power-
ful ally of the CCF government in health reform, formed a strategic and temporary
coalition with the anti-medicare forces in the province. Given the fact that a number
of medical staff within the government’s department of public health were prominent
members of the SCMHA, the CCF government found that it occupied an increas-
ingly divided house at the very time it was struggling to introduce medicare in the
midst of civil unrest and a doctors’ strike.
De´finie comme un ensemble de processus distincts comprenant le recours de´clinant
aux grands instituts psychiatriques et celui croissant aux services de consultations
externes et aux hoˆpitaux ge´ne´raux, la de´sinstitutionnalisation s’est produite plus toˆt
en Saskatchewan que dans toute autre province au Canada. Ce mouvement e´tait
orchestre´ par un gouvernement CCF (Fe´de´ration du Commonwealth coope´ratif)
qui s’e´tait donne´ pour mission d’ope´rer un virage fondamental dans un certain
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nombre de secteurs, dont celui de la sante´ mentale, et qui jouissait en l’occurrence du
soutien d’une des organisations les plus influentes et les mieux organise´es du mouve-
ment social des anne´es 1950, la division de la Saskatchewan de l’Association canadi-
enne pour la sante´ mentale (ACSMS). Mais a` la fin des anne´es 1950 et au de´but des
anne´es 1960, l’ACSMS s’opposa au choix strate´gique qu’avait fait le gouvernement
CCF d’accorder la priorite´ a` l’assurance-maladie, estimant que la mise en place
d’un tel re´gime se faisait aux de´pens des soins de sante´ mentale, allant particulie`re-
ment a` l’encontre de la mise en œuvre d’un syste`me d’hoˆpitaux psychiatriques re´gio-
naux appele´ le Saskatchewan Plan. C’est ainsi que l’ACSMS, jadis un si puissant allie´
du gouvernement CCF dans la re´forme de la sante´, forma une coalition strate´gique
temporaire avec les opposants au re´gime d’assurance-maladie de la province.
Comme d’e´minents membres de l’ACSMS faisaient partie de l’effectif me´dical du min-
iste`re de la Sante´ publique de la province, le gouvernement de la CCF en vint a` re´gner
sur une maison de plus en plus divise´e au moment meˆme ou` il s’e´vertuait a` instituer
l’assurance-maladie sur fond d’agitation sociale et d’une gre`ve des me´decins.
THE TREATMENT of mental illness changed fundamentally in the three
decades following the Second World War. For almost a century before the
1960s, care was largely relegated to mental hospitals that were located in
the countryside, away from major centres of population. It was generally
assumed that the majority of individuals in the custody of these large insti-
tutions had incurable, largely untreatable, conditions and would only
rarely be re-integrated back into regular society. The eventual emptying
of the mental hospitals in advanced industrial countries was the product
of influential mental health advocacy movements as well as major shifts
in mental health policy and psychiatric treatment.1
As with most other advanced industrial countries, deinstitutionalization in
Canada involved at least four distinct processes: (1) a decline in the use of
dedicated psychiatric hospitals and the number of psychiatric hospital beds;
(2) an increase in the number of mental health beds in acute care hospitals
and community-based psychiatric hospitals; (3) an expansion in commu-
nity-based outpatient services; and (4) the introduction of new psycho-
pharmaceutical therapies.2 There were also features that were more unique
1 For more comparative analyses (at least in terms of wealthy industrialized countries) of
deinstitutionalization, see Simon Goodwin, Comparative Mental Health Policy: From
Institutionalization to Community Care (London: Sage, 1997), and Mick Carpenter, “‘It’s a Small
World’: Mental Health Policy under Welfare Capitalism since 1945,” Sociology of Health & Illness,
vol. 22, no. 5 (2000), pp. 602–620. On the American experience, see Gerald Grob, From Asylum to
Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990). Although there are provincial histories of deinstitutionalization, there is no single pan-
Canadian history.
2 Patricia Sealy and Paul C. Whitehead, “Forty Years of Deinstitutionalization of Psychiatric Services
in Canada: An Empirical Assessment,” Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 49, no. 4 (April 2004),
pp. 249–257. John A. Mills and Erika Dyck, “Trust Amply Recompensed: Psychological Research
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to the Canadian experience. For one, deinstitutionalization coincided with
the implementation of universal hospital insurance and the introduction of
medical care insurance – popularly known as “medicare” - and the ultimate
movement of psychiatrists from public sector employment to private clinics
funded by the public purse.3 The other uniquely Canadian feature is the
extent to which mental health policy is determined at the provincial rather
than the national level of government. This is a consequence of a decentra-
lized federation where, for constitutional reasons, the provinces have
primary jurisdiction over health care. This means there have been significant
differences among provinces in terms of the type and timing of mental health
policy and programs, as well as the civil society movements – also highly pro-
vincialized – that have influenced the governments of these provinces. To
take one example, Saskatchewan emptied its mental hospitals, and
implemented the concept of community psychiatry, more rapidly than
other provinces.4 As will be explored at length below, this was a consequence
of two unique factors: 1) the ambitious social policy, including mental health
reform, agenda of North America’s only social democratic government; and
2) the pressure exerted by a powerful civil society organization that combined
considerable grassroots support with elite influence in the government itself.
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) – a party that
combined high idealism, in the tradition of British-inspired Fabian social-
ism and North American social gospel, with a pragmatism born of grass-
roots populism and limited financial resources – was elected in
Saskatchewan in 1944.5 The province was its first and only provincial
beachhead until the 1970s, after the party worked out a formal affiliation
with organized labour and changed its name to the New Democratic Party
(NDP). Here, the party would hold government for two decades allowing
it a unique opportunity to implement its extensive agenda of policy
change, though always cognizant of its fiscal and social constraints, includ-
ing the socially conservative attitudes of the general public in this largely
rural population in the heartland of Canada.6
at Weyburn, Saskatchewan, 1957–1961,” Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, vol. 44,
no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp. 199–218. Andrew Scull, Decarceration: Community Treatment and the
Deviant: A Radical View (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977).
3 Gregory P. Marchildon, “The Policy History of Canadian Medicare,” Canadian Bulletin of Medical
History, vol. 26, no. 2 (2009), pp. 247–260.
4 See Chris Dooley, “The End of the Asylum (Town): Community Responses to the Depopulation and
Closure of the Saskatchewan Hospital, Weyburn,” Histoire Sociale / Social History, in this volume.
5 On the idealistic yet very pragmatic nature of the CCF in government in Saskatchewan, see A.W.
Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams: A Biography of the Douglas Government of Saskatchewan,
1944–1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
6 On the constraints imposed by conservative public attitudes, see Kathleen Kendall, “From Closed
Ranks to Open Doors: Elaine and John Cummings’ Mental Health Education Experiment in 1950s
Saskatchewan,” in this volume.
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Tommy Douglas, in particular, was committed to a fundamental trans-
formation of the funding, administration and delivery of health services
as premier of the province (1944-61), as minister of public health (1944–
49), and subsequently as the first leader of the national NDP (1961–72).7
Douglas’s own knowledge and experience of the living conditions in
mental hospitals, including his personal experience with the mental hospital
in Weyburn, where he lived and worked as a Baptist minister and sub-
sequently as a federally-elected politician during the 1930s, had a major
influence on his thinking, and his zeal to reform mental health. Months
after his provincial election victory in 1944, Douglas introduced a policy
of “free” psychiatric care, three years before he spearheaded the introduc-
tion of universal hospital insurance.8
In its early years, the Douglas government was supported in its health
reform efforts by the most organized voice of the mental health move-
ment, the provincial wing of the Canadian Mental Health Association
(CMHA). With its roots in a social movement dedicated to eliminating
the stigma of mental illness and humanizing and improving treatment,
the Saskatchewan Division of the Canadian Mental Health Association
(SCMHA), to a greater extent than other provincial chapters of the
CMHA, was a powerful “nexus for mobilizing resources and expressing
grievances” in its formative years.9 The SCMHA’s overall mission was to
get the general public and the government to view and treat mental
illness the same way as physical illness. From a policy perspective, this
meant a government willing to devote the equivalent resources to
mental health that it devoted to physical health at a time when consider-
ably more dollars per capita were devoted to acute care in hospitals
than for (what was almost entirely) custodial care in psychiatric hospitals.
The SCMHA was established in 1950 as the first provincial division of
the national organization. Both the federal and provincial governments
encouraged the CMHA to experiment with a provincial branch, and
Saskatchewan was the preferred site because of the progress the province
had already made in mental health policy. To assist in the start-up phase,
7 Thomas H. McLeod and Ian McLeod, Tommy Douglas: The Road to Jerusalem (Edmonton: Hurtig
Publishers, 1987). Greg Marchildon, “The Douglas Legacy and the Future of Medicare” in Bruce
Campbell and Greg Marchildon (eds), Medicare: Facts, Myths, Problems and Promise (Toronto:
Lorimer, 2007), pp. 36–41.
8 This meant free psychiatric treatment during an individual’s lifetime. After death, the province could
claim $3.50 a day for room and board from the individual’s estate except where the estate had been
passed on to any immediate family member residing in Saskatchewan. Dickinson, The Two
Psychiatries, p. 223. Malcolm G Taylor, Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven
Decisions that Created the Canadian Health Insurance System and Their Outcomes (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), chapter 2.
9 See Dominique Cle´ment, “Generations and the Transformation of Social Movements in Postwar
Canada,” Histoire Sociale / Social History, vol. 42, no. 84 (November 2009), p. 363.
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the SCMHAwas provided an annual grant for three years from the federal
government.10 The provincial government also provided financial assist-
ance for five years.11 Both governments wanted a social movement organ-
ization capable of developing “programs to increase public awareness of
mental illness” and preparing “the population at large for the discharge
of previously institutionalized people into the community.”12 At least
initially, the relationship between the CCF government and the SCMHA
was so close that the organization was sometimes perceived as an
agency of the government.13 The SCMHA was supportive of the govern-
ment’s reform efforts, while Douglas and his cabinet members – all of
whom were members of the organization – shared the SCMHA’s
agenda of deinstitutionalization and its campaign to remove the stigma
from mental illness.14
The SCMHA quickly grew to become into one of the most effective
Canadian social advocacy groups of the 1950s. By mid-decade, the
SCMHA had 20,000 members, nine branch offices, with a successful
annual fundraising campaign that gave it financial autonomy from govern-
ment, a freedom it used to push the Douglas government to deinstitutio-
nalize even more rapidly.15 By 1960, at the very peak of its public
influence, the SCMHA had 50,000 members and 15 branch offices in the
province, and was in the midst of a protracted struggle with the provincial
government on the direction of mental health.16 At the centre of what
would ultimately lead to a deep rift, was the government’s inaction on a
detailed blueprint for the construction of eight community-based psychia-
tric hospitals, a key element of what was known as the Saskatchewan Plan.
Joined by prominent psychiatrists both inside and outside the government,
the SCMHA became disenchanted with the Douglas government for
making medicare its chief policy priority over the Saskatchewan Plan.
Having already accomplished more than any other province in transform-
ing mental health care, the CCF government in general was initially sur-
prised and then angered at the SCMHA’s aggressive position,
unleashing an internal fight that would weaken the government internally
10 John D. Griffiths, In Search of Sanity: A Chronicle of the Canadian Mental Health Association,
1918–1988 (London, ON: Third Eye, 1989), p 158.
11 Saskatchewan Archives Board, Regina (hereafter SAB), Erb Papers, R-34, 172A1, letter, Erb To
F.E.R. Badham (SCMHA President), January 14, 1960.
12 Chris Dooley, “The Politics of Deinstitutionalization: Federal Cost-sharing and the Transformation of
Mental Health Care in Saskatchewan, unpublished presentation, September 2008, p. 5.
13 On the history of this close relationship, see Kendall, “From Closed Ranks to Open Doors.”
14 At least in 1951, every cabinet minister was a member of the CMHA: SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1,
XIV 572 (14-26), letter, Laycock to Douglas, February 9, 1951.
15 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), Canadian Mental Health Association, Saskatchewan
Division, 6th Annual Report, March 1957.
16 John A. Mills, “Lessons from the Periphery: Psychiatry in Saskatchewan, Canada, 1944–68,” History
of Psychiatry, vol. 18, no. 2 (2007), p. 183.
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at the very time it needed as many allies as possible in order implement
medicare against the wishes of organized medicine and its powerful allies.
Douglas Government’s Early Support of Community-Based
Mental Health
Douglas had been critical of the type of care offered in psychiatric hospi-
tals long before he became premier of Saskatchewan. While serving as a
Baptist minister in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, in the early 1930s, he con-
cluded that the province’s two “mental” hospitals were overcrowded
“holding pens”, primarily staffed by untrained workers. He studied a
group of patients at the Weyburn mental hospital as part of his Master’s
thesis. While visiting the institution one late afternoon, Douglas was mis-
taken as a patient by an attendant who refused to release him until he
could prove his identity, an experience he long remembered.17
Upon becoming Premier, Douglas appointed Dr. Clarence Hincks, the
founder of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene – the organiz-
ation out of which the CMHA would emerge in 1950 – to investigate
the province’s psychiatric hospitals. Hincks highlighted the problem of
overcrowding – the Saskatchewan Hospital North Battleford (opened in
1914) had 1,716 patients in a facility meant for 1,174 patients, while the
Saskatchewan Hospital Weyburn (opened in 1921) had 2,485 patients in
a facility built for 1,040 patients. He recommended adopting a more com-
munity oriented system involving regionally-based outpatient clinics and
psychiatric wards in all the general hospitals.18
While Douglas readily accepted Hincks’ analysis and recommendation
on overcrowding, he rejected Hincks’ recommendation to forcibly sterilize
mental defectives.19 In his Master’s thesis (completed in 1933), Douglas
studied a sample of the female population at the Weyburn hospital, and
had then endorsed sterilization. However, his view on sterilization under-
went a massive change in the years that followed as reflected in a “set of
letters he wrote to concerned members of the public repudiating the use of
sterilization.”20
Hincks’ report also posed a dilemma.21 While he advised the provincial
government to move towards a community-based system, Hincks also
urged that a third psychiatric hospital be built as soon as possible to
17 Stuart Houston and Bill Waiser, Tommy’s Team: The People behind the Douglas Years (Calgary: Fifth
House, 2010), p. 118.
18 Harley D. Dickinson, The Two Psychiatries: The Transformation of Psychiatric Work in
Saskatchewan, 1905–1984 (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1989), pp. 77–80.
19 Houston and Waiser, Tommy’s Team, p. 226.
20 John A. Mills, “Lessons from the Periphery: Psychiatry in Saskatchewan, Canada, 1944–68,” History
of Psychiatry, vol. 18, no. 2 (2007), p. 181.
21 Clarence M. Hincks, Mental Hygiene Survey of Saskatchewan (Regina: King’s Printer, 1945).
Unfortunately, there is nothing in Charles G. Roland’s biography of Hincks concerning his work
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alleviate the problem of overcrowding in the two existing provincial insti-
tutions. To help the government decide on the best way forward, Douglas
recruited Dr. Donald Griffith (Griff) McKerracher from Ontario to
occupy the new position of director of psychiatric services in the
Department of Public Health in 1946.22 As Douglas explained to the
members of the legislative assembly, McKerracher would spearhead the
province’s “ambitious mental hygiene [health] program” that would intro-
duce outpatient clinics to “pick up cases in their early stages and provide
early treatment” – a development Douglas considered even more impor-
tant than improvements to treatment and care in existing and new psychia-
tric hospitals.23
Heading a new division of mental health services within the Department
of Public Health, McKerracher soon established one full-time (Regina)
and three part-time (North Battleford, Weyburn, and Moose Jaw) outpa-
tient mental health clinics connected to general and psychiatric facilities as
a forerunner to a larger number of regional outpatient clinics.24 At the
same time, McKerracher’s staff worked on improving the operations and
facilities of the existing psychiatric hospitals, as well as on planning for a
third hospital.25 A psychiatric nursing program, the first of its type in
North America, was introduced. As well, a training program for psychia-
trists, the first one in Canada accepted by the Royal College of
Physicians and Surgeons, was also developed in the province.26
In 1950, the provincial Mental Health Act was amended to change the
purpose of mental hospitals from custody to therapy. That same year,
in Saskatchewan: Clarence Hincks: Mental Health Crusader (Toronto: Hannah Institute and
Dundurn Press, 1990).
22 Receiving his medical degree and subsequently his specialization in psychiatry at the University of
Toronto, Griff McKerracher (1909–1970) had worked in various positions in the mental health
system in Ontario before organizing psychiatric treatment for the Toronto military district and
working as a specialist at a major neurological hospital in England during the Second World War.
Houston and Waiser, Tommy’s Team, pp. 117–118.
23 Douglas quoted in Colin M. Smith, “Necessity and Creativity: Innovations in Service Delivery in
Saskatchewan Pre and Post War,” text of unpublished speech delivered to the Saskatchewan
Psychiatric Services Annual Clinical Conference, Regina, Oct. 16, 1980, obtained from CMHA
Resource Centre, Regina.
24 D.G. McKerracher, “Community Psychiatric Developments in Saskatchewan,” Canadian Medical
Association Journal, vol. 59 (December 1948), pp. 546–548. The full-time clinics performed three
functions: (1) providing consultation and diagnostic services on behalf of physicians and social
agencies; (2) educating organizations and individuals on mental health; and (3) providing
outpatient treatment. Part-time clinics were limited to providing the first two services. Dickinson,
The Two Psychiatries, p. 140.
25 Implemented in 1947, the Saskatchewan Hospital Services Plan provided full coverage for patients in
the psychiatric unit of a general hospital. According to Harley Dickinson (The Two Psychiatries,
p. 74), it would take two more years before the Douglas government introduced universally free
care in the province’s two psychiatric hospitals.
26 Dickinson, The Two Psychiatries, pp. 110 and 140–144.
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the CCF government reorganized the mental health division into the
Psychiatric Services Branch (PSB) with McKerracher as director.
Described by one scholar as a “semi-independent fiefdom,” the PSB
would become one of the most powerful agencies in the Douglas govern-
ment.27 Although successive PSB directors were to report to the bureau-
cratic (deputy minister) and political (minister) heads of the Department
of Public Health, they often bypassed these reporting relationships to
deal directly with the premier. No branch in the Douglas government
grew as fast. By the mid-1950s, the PSB had more than 1,200 employees,
almost 60 of whom were medical staff, including 20 psychiatrists – to
staff the two provincial mental hospitals, the policy and planning unit in
Regina, and a psychiatric research unit in Saskatoon.28 By 1964, the year
the CCF government left office, the PSB had 2,140 staff members. This
represented 17 per cent of the entire public service, and about 80 per
cent of the Department of Public Health, the single largest department
in the provincial government.
As the golden child of the government, the PSB’s budget climbed
almost exponentially from 1950 until 1964.29 However, the PSB was
also a demanding child, insisting – often in concert with the
SCMHA – that the government do more for mental health. As
members of the SCMHA, PSB medical staff often assisted the organiz-
ation in its advocacy efforts with government. Moreover, some PSB
staff, particularly psychiatrists, viewed themselves more as medical pro-
fessionals than as civil servants. By the mid-1950s, Douglas had become
so frustrated by the PSB that he vented his dissatisfaction in a memor-
andum to Walter Erb, the provincial minister of public health from 1956
until 1961:
There is no Government activity which has had such a rapid increase in
expenditure as the Psychiatric Branch. However, instead of telling the
public how much has been done to improve conditions in mental institutions
and in the treatment and care of mental patients, the whole aim of the psy-
chiatric Branch seem to be to tell the public how little we have done in this
regard. Consequently all the publicity from the Mental Health Associations
groups has been critical rather than helpful. I lay the blame for this squarely
upon some of our own employees who are apparently trying to blackmail the
Government into complying with their proposals by trying to create a public
demand which they think will force us into accepting their proposals. I am
quite prepared to go as far as our finances will permit in extending psychia-
tric services but I do not propose to allow Government employees to create
27 Mills, “Lessons from the Periphery,” p. 191.
28 Mills, “Lessons from the Periphery,” p. 184.
29 Dickinson, The Two Psychiatries, p. 175.
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appetites which cannot be satisfied and to encourage groups of laymen to cri-
ticize our program in order to satisfy their obsession for empire building.30
The Saskatchewan Plan
The rift between the Douglas government and the SCMHA centred on the
Saskatchewan Plan, a plan that was developed in the mid-1950s, but not
implemented, and even then in a much altered form, until the 1960s. In
1953, the PSB was already discussing the feasibility of building seven or
eight cottage-style psychiatric hospitals to serve every region of the pro-
vince.31 The PSB would continue working on the details of the
Saskatchewan Plan until it finally produced a comprehensive blueprint
in 1955. The essence of the plan was to divide the province into eight
mental health regions each with a psychiatric hospital with anywhere
from 238 to 448 beds housed in cottage units. Each regional hospital
would serve a population of roughly 73,000 people, and encompass a
small enough geographic area that no patient would have to travel
further than 130 kilometres to get to-and-from the hospital. As well, the
hospitals would also provide a base for travelling clinic services.32 From
the beginning, the SCMHA gave the Saskatchewan Plan its unqualified
support, perhaps in part because its executive was so influenced by PSB
psychiatrists.33
In 1955, when Saskatchewan’s first teaching hospital was opened
beside the College of Medicine at the University of Saskatchewan,
Griff McKerracher left the provincial government to become the found-
ing department chair of psychiatry. His replacement as Director of the
PSB was Dr. Sam Lawson (1902–1970). Like McKerracher, Lawson
had qualified in medicine at the University of Toronto and specialized
in psychiatry in Ontario. McKerracher had recruited Lawson as superin-
tendent of the Weyburn psychiatric hospital in 1947, and then transferred
him to become superintendent of the North Battleford facility a year
later.34
The Saskatchewan Plan had been largely a collective effort among PSB
senior staff, including McKerracher, Abram Hoffer (Director of Research
30 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), memorandum, Douglas to Erb, January 31, 1957.
31 Canadian Mental Health Association, Saskatchewan Division, “Summary of the History of
Psychiatric Services in Saskatchewan,” unpublished manuscript dated Oct. 1981, p. 2.
32 Mills, “Lessons from the Periphery,” p. 184.
33 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), Canadian Mental Health Association, Saskatchewan
Division, Annual Report, March 1957. Lawson was Chair of the CMHA’s Scientific Planning
Committee. Griff McKerracher along with government-employed psychiatrists Abram Hoffer
(Director of Research), Humphrey Osmond (Superintendent, Saskatchewan Hospital Weyburn),
and M. Demay (PSB) as well as PSB psychologist Duncan Blewett.
34 See short biographies of both Lawson (pp. 87–92) and McKerracher (pp. 116–121) in Stuart
Houston and Bill Waiser’s Tommy’s Team.
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in Saskatoon), and Humphry Osmond (Superintendent of Saskatchewan
Hospital Weyburn).35 However, it was Lawson who would be most
closely associated with the Saskatchewan Plan.36 Though both he and
Lawson were prominent members of the SCMHA, McKerracher consist-
ently sought a balance in weighing what the SCMHA advocated and
what the government could deliver, in part because he shared the govern-
ment’s health reform objectives and understood the fiscal constraints and
competing priorities. In contrast, Lawson could not – or would not – sep-
arate his role as a civil servant from that of a mental health advocate.
Unlike McKerracher, he was unwilling to revisit the Saskatchewan Plan
and make adjustments to meet the needs of the government.
During his time as Director of the PSB, McKerracher had been willing
to operate on two tracks simultaneously, one of which involved an expan-
sion of outpatient mental health, and a second track that required contin-
ued investment in the existing psychiatric hospitals in order to improve
inpatient services. Conversely, Lawson only operated on one track. He
wanted the psychiatric hospitals closed and rapidly replaced with a
series of smaller community mental hospitals, and he was dismissive of
the concerns raised by members of cabinet and the government’s senior
officials responsible for planning and budgeting. Finally, preoccupied as
he was with an innovative approach to psychiatric hospital care involving
novel architectural designs, Lawson was simply less focused on outpatient
mental health services than McKerracher though this too was an integral
part of the process of deinstitutionalization.
Almost immediately after his appointment as PSB Director, Lawson
pressed the minister of public health for approval of the Saskatchewan
Plan, and thus to allow the PSB to immediately abandon plans to accom-
modate more than 1,100 new patients at Weyburn and North Battleford.
Lawson argued that if the government refused to agree, the PSB would
have to expand the existing psychiatric hospitals at a cost that would
meet or exceed the cost of the eight new community-based psychiatric hos-
pitals he was recommending.37 Though the Minister of Health was
attracted to the idea, he also realized that the cost of such a major
program of construction might forestall an immediate decision from
35 On Hoffer and Osmond, see Erika Dyck, Psychedelic Psychiatry: LSD from Clinic to Campus
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
36 Dickinson, The Two Psychiatries, p. 147. Hugh G. Lafave, Alex Stewart, and Frederic Grunberg,
“Community Care of the Mentally Ill: Implementation of the Saskatchewan Plan,” Community
Mental Health, vol. 4, no. 1 (February 1968), pp. 37–38.
37 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G2, letter, Lawson to Thomas J. Bentley, June 1, 1955. Succeeding
Tommy Douglas, Bentley held the post of Minister of Public Health from November 14, 1949,
until July 27, 1956, when he was replaced by J. Walter Erb who, in turn, would hold the post until
November 21, 1961: Saskatchewan Executive and Legislative Directory, 1905–1970 (Regina and
Saskatoon: Saskatchewan Archives Board, 1971), pp. 26–27.
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cabinet.38 In response to concerns about cost, Lawson simply asserted that
the government would save money in the long-run, while the immediate
cost would be little more than the money needed to refurbish the
Weyburn and North Battleford hospitals. As well, Lawson noted that
some European countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom) had already adopted similar policies, passing
laws limiting the size of new mental hospitals to less than 500 beds.39
From his new base at University Hospital in Saskatoon, McKerracher
also lobbied the Minister of Health. While his description of what he
called the “Saskatchewan Plan” was almost identical to Lawson’s
version, he did not assume that the Saskatchewan Plan would cost less
than the status quo. On the contrary, he claimed “this program will and
should cost more” because (finally), “the mentally sick will receive the
treatment that sick persons should.”40
Cabinet refused to give Lawson and the PSB approval in principle.
Instead, the government established a sub-committee to examine the
potential costs and benefits of the Saskatchewan Plan. Lawson was
infuriated because he thought cabinet was simply avoiding the difficult
decision of decommissioning its old mental hospitals, and the sub-commit-
tee was its “polite” way of either delaying action or rejecting the proposal.
Concluding that the committee was a waste of time, he resisted the
Minister of Health’s suggestion that he appoint someone from the PSB
to assist the committee on a full-time basis. Nonetheless, the PSB was
forced to provide more details on the Saskatchewan Plan and its costs to
the cabinet committee. Lawson took great offense at the extent to which
the government’s central agency – the Economic Advisory and Planning
Board and its secretary, economist Tommy Shoyama – questioned the esti-
mates provided by the PSB.41
The expense of the plan, once tabulated in full, was shocking to the
cabinet. The cost of building eight new regional psychiatric hospitals was
estimated to be between $13.2 million and $18.8 million, while annual
operating costs were estimated at $11.4 million (fully double the $5.7
million the government had budgeted to spend on all the psychiatric facili-
ties in the province including its newly constructed home for the “mentally
retarded” in Moose Jaw). The Saskatchewan Plan was impossible in the
short-term and to even have a hope in the long-term, it would require
federal assistance through the Government of Canada’s hospital construc-
tion grants. These grants could possibly pay for $4.4 million of the con-
struction but only if the architectural design met federally stipulated
38 SAB, Erb Papers, 172G2, letter, Bentley to Douglas, June 5, 1955.
39 SAB, Erb Papers, 172G2, letter with attachments, Lawson to Bentley, November 14, 1955.
40 SAB, Psychiatric Unit Papers, R-999, 42, letter, McKerracher to Bentley, December 2, 1955.
41 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), memorandum, Lawson to Erb, November 22, 1956.
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hospital constructions standards, fire regulations, and building codes.42
Also, if the federal government was eventually able to secure sufficient
agreement from the provinces to proceed, it might provide cost-sharing
to the provinces for the operating costs of hospital care in a new national
hospital insurance plan.
Unable to get the immediate support from government on his own for
the Saskatchewan Plan, Lawson decided to use the SCMHA to pressure
Douglas’ cabinet. At the annual Regina branch meeting in January
1957, Lawson outlined the architectural plans prepared for the PSB for
the eight new psychiatric hospitals in Regina, Saskatoon, Swift Current,
Yorkton, Prince Albert, Melfort, Wadena, and Moosomin.43 Although he
explained that the plan’s cost had not yet been approved by the provincial
government, he raised hopes that action was imminent.
The television and newspaper coverage of the Regina SCMHA meeting
focused on the SCMHA’s criticism of the government for past inaction on
the Saskatchewan Plan and its new found hope, conveyed by Lawson, that
the government was finally about to implement the plan. According to
Douglas, it was “completely irrelevant for Dr. Lawson to claim that he
is merely outlining a plan which has been approved by the American
Psychiatric Association. Dr. Lawson is an employee of the Saskatchewan
Government and any plan which he outlines is assumed by the general
public to represent the views of the Government.” Moreover, “[w]hat
Dr. Lawson and other members of the Psychiatric Services Branch are
doing is to raise hopes which I see no prospect of the Government
being able to satisfy. To speak of eight new hospitals with bed capacities
ranging from 268 to 448 is to envisage a capital expenditure which the
Government has never at any time contemplated.”44
In mid-March of 1957, on the heels of the provincial budget, the
Executive Director of the SCMHA launched a second volley, criticizing
the provincial government for not funding the Saskatchewan Plan. As a
member of the SCMHA, Douglas immediately sent a letter to the
SCMHA’s President demanding to know “whether or not the views
expressed in the press item” reflected the opinion and were authorized
by “the executive of the Saskatchewan Division of the Canadian Mental
Health Association.” While he had “no desire to get into a controversy
in the press with the officers of the Association,” he nonetheless concluded
42 Dickinson, The Two Psychiatries, p. 154.
43 These plans, including preliminary sketches of the Y-shaped cottage units of the proposed hospitals
that were prepared by Kiyoshi Izumi’s Regina-based architectural firm, were published in the journal
Mental Hospitals in March 1957 (pp. 27–31): SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172 G2. Also see Erika Dyck,
“Kiyoshi Izumi and Mental Hospital Designs,” Annual Bulletin of the Institute for Economic and
Cultural Studies (2009), pp. 71–87.
44 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), memorandum, Douglas to Erb, January 31, 1957,
attaching Regina Leader-Post article entitled “Mental hospital plan discussed” of January 29, 1957.
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that “some of the statements which were made cannot be allowed to go
unchallenged.”45
The response to Douglas was sharp. The Executive Director’s views
were indeed shared by the executive of the SCMHA (including Lawson
as chair of the SCMHA’s scientific planning committee). After stating
that the SCMHA was “very appreciative of all the Government has
done and is doing” in terms of new outpatient clinics and psychiatric
wards, the SCMHA President went on to blast Douglas’ government for
its slow action on the Saskatchewan Plan:
We realize that the provision of adequate care of the mentally ill is a tremen-
dous undertaking involving enormous cost; but we are sincerely advocating
that a reasonable step towards more adequate care is the building of regional
mental hospitals as quickly as possible. From the long range point of view,
the hospital population with better treatment will decrease and, conse-
quently, materially lessen the drain on public funds.
From the foregoing you will see that it is not the intention of this
Association to belittle in any way the work which the Government has
done. However, one of the aims of the Association is to carry on a vigorous
education program so that the Saskatchewan public will realize that the care
of the mentally ill should be comparable to the care given to people suffering
from physical illnesses. We most emphatically believe that we must continu-
ally bring these matters to the attention of the public since in our democracy
it is our belief that the work of the Government is the will of the people.
Throughout Canada and in the United States people are looking to
Saskatchewan for leadership in the Mental Health field. What has been
done is being recognized; but the fact remains that even with the progress
which has been made in Saskatchewan, the amount of money spent on the
care and treatment of the mentally ill is a small percentage of the amount
spent to bring health to the physically ill.
I feel sure that you will understand our thinking in this connection. Should
you be publicly commenting on Mr. Rohn’s press statement, I should be very
happy to have you give this letter to the press.46
To gauge how he should deal with the SCMHA, Douglas sought counsel
from McKerracher who was also disturbed about the “misunderstandings”
that had arisen between the government and the SCMHA. In
McKerracher’s view, it “seemed unfortunate that the one Provincial
45 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, Douglas to Mrs. M.P. Toombs (President,
SCMHA), March 15, 1957, with attachment of article entitled “Mental health aid criticized”,
morning edition of the Regina Leader-Post, March 15, 1957.
46 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, N.M. Toombs (SCMHA President) to
Douglas, March 18, 1957.
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Government which has done the most for the mentally ill and the
Provincial Association which has been so successful in arousing public
support, should through unfortunate newspaper publicity be at logger-
heads.”47 Douglas felt that the SCMHA should give the government
credit for what he felt was the most ambitious and expensive psychiatric
program in the country, but the SCMHA was about to do the opposite.48
Just weeks after the exchange of letters, the president and executive
director of the SCMHA followed up with an open letter to the press
that expressed “grave concern about the [government’s] apparent disre-
gard for the urgency of immediate action.” They insisted that while the
CCF government had once had “the most progressive mental health
program in Canada,” its current policy of “compromise solutions and
half-measures” had allowed it to slip “from its leading position.” The offi-
cial representatives of the SCMHA then took the Douglas government to
task for “discriminating against the mentally ill by allocating dispropor-
tionate amounts of money for the care of the physically ill.” If only the
government “accepted the recommendations of their advisors” to
proceed with the Saskatchewan Plan, they claimed, the government
would be spending not much more than $750,000 it had just approved
for an expansion and updating of the psychiatric hospital in North
Battleford.49
One of the striking features of the Douglas government, a reflection of
its populist legacy and its linkage with progressive social movements in the
province, was the regularity with which cabinet met with interest groups –
particularly social movement organizations such as the SCMHA – a
minimum of once a year in what were called “cabinet delegation days.”50
For each of these meetings, the participating interest group would
prepare a comprehensive position paper that would be circulated to
cabinet members in advance of the meeting.51 These meetings usually
served to improve or cement relations between the government and the
social movement organizations, including the SCMHA, that shared at
least some of the social policy objectives of the Douglas government. In
many respects, these cabinet delegation days, and the relationships they
fostered between the CCF and their natural allies in civil society, were
47 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, McKerracher to Douglas, March 29, 1957.
48 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, Douglas to McKerracher, April 8, 1957.
49 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), clipping entitled “Mental Health Needs Neglected
(signed by Mrs. N.M. Toombs, President, and Mr. George Rohn, Executive Director, Canadian
Mental Health Association), Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, April 13, 1957.
50 A.W. Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams: A Biography of the Douglas Government of Saskatchewan,
1944–1961 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), pp. 110–111.
51 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter with SCMHA brief, Lewis A. Henbury
(Executive Director, SCMHA) to Douglas, September 27, 1957, and cabinet memorandum
attaching SCMHA brief, H.S. Lee (Cabinet Secretary) to all ministers, September 30, 1957.
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the support beams for the social democratic house that was built in
Saskatchewan after 1944.
Before 1957, the SCMHA, in its annual cabinet delegation meetings,
lauded the Douglas government’s path breaking efforts in mental health,
and accepted the government’s argument that fiscal constraints and
numerous other public policy priorities demanded patience in terms of
implementation. However, in October 1957, the cabinet delegation
meeting was a disaster for the Douglas government. The SCMHA’s 12-
page brief was blunt in its criticism of the CCF government for not imple-
menting the Saskatchewan Plan despite the fact that the “idea of small
regional community mental hospitals” had received “wide acclaim across
the Dominion and other countries.” The brief went on to say that the gov-
ernment of Ontario had “already accepted this plan in practice” and that it
“would be regrettable if this idea, the ‘brain child’ of Saskatchewan, were
to be effectively put into operation first by another province.”52 The session
was made even worse when the government chose the occasion to inform
the SCMHA that it had decided to alter its approach to implementing the
Saskatchewan Plan. Instead of building regional psychiatric hospitals, it
would instead construct psychiatric units attached to existing general
hospitals. Shocked – or at least feigning shock – the president of the
SCMHA, M.P. Toombs, and her delegation, walked away from the
meeting convinced that the provincial government had completely rejected
the Saskatchewan Plan.53 At the root of this confrontation were the provin-
cial government’s negotiations to obtain the federal government’s support,
in the form of shared-cost cash transfers, for its hospitalization program,
as well as an agreement reached privately between Douglas and
McKerracher months before.
Although the SCMHA accused the Douglas government of abandoning
the Saskatchewan Plan in its cabinet delegation meeting in October 1957,
the CCF government was simply trying to adjust the plan in order to make
any proposed psychiatric facilities eligible for the federal hospital grants
program. Federal cost sharing was the subject of a long meeting
between Douglas and McKerracher months before. Sympathetic to the
government’s need for federal assistance, McKerracher suggested an
idea: the proposed regional psychiatric hospitals could be built close
enough to the general hospital that they would be “considered as an inte-
gral part of the general hospital,” and thus eligible for the federal hospital
construction grants, and perhaps even operating funds under the national
hospital insurance program. Douglas concluded that the government could
52 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), submission (11 pp) to the Government of
Saskatchewan by Canadian Mental Health Association, Saskatchewan Division, October 1957,
resume and p. 4.
53 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, McKerracher to Douglas, October 10, 1957.
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more easily afford two or three 50-bed units rather than the eight larger
hospitals being recommended by Lawson and the PSB. McKerracher
agreed on pragmatic grounds, suggesting that once the federal govern-
ment’s responsibility for the 50-bed units was established, these same
units could be expanded to the size necessary to serve a designated
region, as was originally proposed in the Saskatchewan Plan. On this
point, Douglas disagreed with McKerracher, preferring the units be kept
permanently small since there was a high risk that larger, separated facili-
ties “would give these a stigma which General Hospital facilities would not
have.” McKerracher was not convinced of Douglas’s argument but none-
theless accepted the point that obtaining federal cash was the key to any
transition from the isolation of the old mental hospitals to a new commu-
nity psychiatry model that would treat patients when necessary with the
goal of reintegrating into society as soon as possible.54
Lawson got wind of the conversation when he was asked to draw up new
plans for 50-bed units attached to existing hospitals, and was infuriated by
McKerracher’s role in what he perceived as a gutting of the Saskatchewan
Plan.55 Although Lawson was told not to inform the SCMHA of this direc-
tion just in case any resulting publicity would encourage the federal
Minister of Health to “change his rules in mid-stream”, he was an execu-
tive officer of the organization, and it is hard to imagine Lawson did not
complain to other members of the SCMHA about the government’s
new directions.56 Moreover, it is clear that the SCMHA went into the
cabinet delegation meeting ready to do battle with the government.
After the failed cabinet delegation meeting, Douglas wrote to the pre-
sident of the SCMHA to explain the state of federal-provincial nego-
tiations on universal hospital insurance. Parliament has just passed the
Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act committing the federal
government to cost-sharing universal hospital insurance in each province.
The law stipulated that cost-sharing targeted acute care hospitals rather
than institutions providing long-term chronic care including nursing
homes and psychiatric hospitals. While the government’s public position
(echoing that of other provincial governments) was to try and convince
the federal government to amend the legislation so that it would include
cost-sharing for psychiatric hospitals, it was quietly seeking out the
federal government’s position on regional psychiatric hospitals, arguing
that the proposed facilities would operate more like general hospitals,
54 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, McKerracher to Douglas, October 10, 1957.
55 In 1963, when the acting Deputy Minister of Health (Dr. Vince Matthews) accepted McKerracher’s
view that general practitioners should be more central in delivering mental health care, Lawson
exploded, stating that “McKerracher’s part in the delay in instituting the Saskatchewan Plan while
we play with this inadequate nonsense is, to my mind, criminal.” SAB, Psychiatric Research
Centre Papers, R-999, 45a, memorandum, Lawson to V.L. Matthews, April 9, 1963, p. 1.
56 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, McKerracher to Douglas, October 10, 1957.
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treating patients for a limited period and then releasing them back to the
community. Although Douglas took pains to emphasize that the cabinet
had not abandoned “the plan of constructing regional psychiatric units”
to the SCMHA, he also made it clear that federal cost-sharing would be
essential to funding the Saskatchewan Plan, and that his government
was examining alternative ways of achieving the plan in order “to secure
the maximum financial contribution possible” from Ottawa. “If regional
psychiatric hospitals are to be excluded from the national hospital insur-
ance plan,” Douglas stated, then the government would consider attaching
psychiatric units to general hospitals. He also warned that the provincial
government could not decide on its approach until the federal government
was prepared to state its position on the question.57
Complicating matters at the time was Sam Lawson’s increasingly testy
relationship with the government he worked for. In almost continual
conflict with the minister of public health and the premier, he com-
plained about political interference in his management of the PSB. He
complained to his colleagues in the Saskatchewan Psychiatric
Association about Erb overriding his decision on the promotion of a psy-
chiatric nurse. The Association then complained to Douglas, who
responded: “if Dr. Lawson had a complaint regarding the actions of
his Minister the proper thing for him to have done was to discuss this
matter with me rather than to take his complaint to the Saskatchewan
Psychiatric Association. It is somewhat unusual for a civil servant to
be carrying on a controversy with his Minister through a third party
especially when the third party cannot possibly be in possession of all
the facts.”58
Lawson’s direction of the North Battleford psychiatric hospital was also
being questioned. Douglas had received a battery of allegations concern-
ing abuse and intimidation in the workforce as well as the poor manage-
ment and direction of the psychiatric hospital in North Battleford from
one of his own backbenchers. The minister of public health ordered an
investigation and the subsequent report was scathing in its assessment of
Lawson’s ability as a senior administrator, both in his role as head of
the PSB and in his former role as superintendent of North Battleford.59
With its charges and counter-charges, the controversy over the North
Battleford facility would go on for years. Although he was protected
from being fired for insubordination because of his affiliation with, and
influence within, the SCMHA, the North Battleford controversy
57 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), letter, Douglas to M.P. Toombs, October 21, 1957.
58 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 013T, letter, Douglas to Colin M. Smith (Secretary Treasurer, Saskatchewan
Psychiatric Association), September 9, 1957.
59 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)d, memorandum on problems – North Battleford
Hospital, R. Brown to Erb, November 25, 1958.
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further damaged Lawson’s already precarious standing with Douglas and
Erb.60
Both Lawson and the SCMHA showed relatively little interest in the
federal-provincial negotiations over the implementation of national hos-
pital insurance despite the fact that the final outcome of these proceed-
ings would determine the fate of the original version of the
Saskatchewan Plan. Earlier, the Saskatchewan government, joined by
almost all other provincial governments, had argued that psychiatric hos-
pitals should be included in federal cost-sharing, but the position was
consistently (and publicly) rejected by successive federal adminis-
trations.61 At the same time, private instructions were given to provincial
government negotiators to get smaller, regionally based psychiatric hos-
pitals approved. After considering the nuanced provincial position on
the redesigned version of the regional psychiatric hospitals, the federal
health minister gave his final answer in August 1958. While the
Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act contemplated “the
recent development of psychiatric wards in general hospitals for the
active treatment of acute phases of mental illness”, the federal govern-
ment would not fund any units separated in any way from a general hos-
pital, even “relatively small mental hospitals in close relationships to
general hospitals,” because of the “specific exclusion of hospitals and
institutions for the mentally ill” in the original law.62 From that point
on, the Douglas government was hesitant to fund any psychiatric unit
or facility that was not a psychiatric ward attached to a general hospital,
and in the government’s view, it was time to move past the Saskatchewan
Plan.63 Only a looming political battle could force the government to
return to PSB’s original vision.
60 SAB: Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)d, letters, F.B. Roth to Erb, March 25, 1959, Kramer to
Douglas, March 31 1959, R. Brown to Erb, April 13, 1959, R. Brown to Douglas, October 24, 1960,
Kramer to Douglas, December 22, 1960, Douglas to Erb, January 3, 1961. Chris Dooley arrived at
the same conclusion in “The Politics of Deinstitutionalization.”
61 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1: XIV 572 (14-26), Erb to A.V. Svobads, August 1, 1957. SAB, Canadian
Mental Health Association Papers, R-327, 1.61, clipping of Regina Leader Post article entitled
“Federal Action Urged”, January 11, 1963 in which it is stated that the Saskatchewan government
continues to urge the federal government to deem psychiatric hospitals as eligible for cost-sharing.
62 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 015A, letter, Jay Waldo Monteith (Minister of Health and Welfare,
Government of Canada) to Erb, August 22, 1958. Also see Dickinson, The Two Psychiatries,
pp. 159–160.
63 SAB, Douglas Papers, XIV 554 (14-8), cabinet minute no. 9856, Lee to Douglas and members of
cabinet, February 19, 1960. Although initially opposed to psychiatric wards replacing psychiatric
hospitals, McKerracher said that, with the advent of psychotropic drug therapies, it could be made
to work as long as general practitioners were providing primary care to patients in consultation
with psychiatrists. Lawson was opposed entirely to the use of psychiatric wards, arguing that it
would put the practice of mental health back a decade. See Dickinson, The Two Pschiatries,
pp. 162–164.
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Medicare and Conflict Within
In a 1959 by-election leading to the next provincial general election,
Douglas announced his government’s intention to introduce universal
medical care insurance. Douglas had been promising medicare since his
first provincial election campaign, and with the federal government now
cost-sharing the hospital insurance program his government had estab-
lished in 1947, the timing seemed perfect. The reaction was polarized –
enthusiastic support from CCF Party supporters, organized labour as
well as church and social action groups, but hostile opposition from orga-
nized medicine, the opposition parties, as well as business and professional
groups. The election campaign of 1960 focused almost exclusively on this
one issue, in part because of the vocal and well-funded opposition of the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan.64
After the provincial election victory of 1960, his fifth since 1944,
Douglas assumed that organized medicine in the province would accept
the result. Instead, the doctors and their sympathetic allies in business
and politics continued working together in a major effort to prevent the
government from implementing medicare.65 The SCMHA should have
been one of the Douglas government’s natural allies in the medicare
battle. Instead, the government’s awkward effort to begin implementing
one dimension of the original Saskatchewan Plan only served to further
alienate the SCMHA. As a consequence, the SCMHA became a strategic
partner in the coalition opposing medicare.
Months before the 1960 election, a CCF backbencher announced with
great fanfare that his Yorkton constituency would get a 150-bed psychiatric
hospital, the first instalment of the Saskatchewan Plan.66 The announce-
ment sounded final, but in reality, the government was still in the
process of reviewing three different levels of integration with the existing
general hospital in Yorkton in order to qualify for shared-cost financing
from the federal government – now a necessity given that the govern-
ment’s medicare proposal would have to be paid for without any federal
assistance. In fact, the provincial department of Public Works redrew the
plans to allocate more space per patient to meet the federal requirements
for hospital construction grants.67 In March 1960, the Yorkton facility was,
in Douglas’ own words, “squeezed into” the provincial budget, despite the
64 Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams, pp. 254–257.
65 Gregory P. Marchildon and Klaartje Schrijvers, “Physician Resistance and the Forging of Public
Health Care: A Comparative Analysis of Doctors’ Strikes in Canada and Belgium in the 1960s,”
Medical History, vol. 55, no. 2 (2011), pp. 203–222.
66 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, clipping from Yorkton Enterprise entitled “Mental Hospital At
Once”, January 14, 1960, and clipping from Regina Leader-Post entitled “Mental Hospital Start in
Yorkton”, January 14, 1960.
67 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)a, cabinet memorandum (cabinet minute no. 9856),
H.S. Lee to Douglas and Treasury Board ministers.
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government still being without a guarantee of federal financing.68 In fact,
what the government had actually done was allocate only $500,000 of
the estimated $1.1 to $1.3 million needed for construction of the
Yorkton facility, in the hope that a federal hospital construction grant
would be forthcoming.69 This was an uncharacteristic decision for a govern-
ment with a long track record of fiscal probity. It is difficult not to con-
clude, as historian Chris Dooley speculates, that this decision was more
about neutralizing “the mental health lobby in advance of an anticipated
confrontation with physicians over Medicare,” than a sincere effort to
implement the PSB’s original conception of the Saskatchewan Plan.70 If
this was the Douglas government’s intention, it soon backfired.
While the announcement prompted congratulations from many parts of the
mental health lobby, including McKerracher in his personal capacity and the
Saskatchewan Psychiatric Nurses Association in its corporate capacity, the
SCMHA was relatively quiet in its support.71 One possible explanation for
this is that the SCMHA was offended because its earlier application for a
$10,000 grant for the resocialization of psychiatric patients had been rejected
in the same budget process that had approved the Yorkton psychiatric facility.72
The more powerful explanation is that the SCMHA executive no longer
believed that the CCF government was committed to the Saskatchewan
Plan and, while it might ultimately build the Yorkton facility, it would not
carry out the rest of the plan as originally conceived by the PSB, and all of
its discretionary funding would flow into medicare instead. Some SCMHA
executive members asked the same question that the College of Physicians
and Surgeons of Saskatchewan – the government’s chief opponent in the
battle over medicare – was rhetorically posing to the public: why wasn’t the
provincial government looking “after the needs of the mentally and chroni-
cally ill before undertaking a medical care insurance plan of such scope?”73
68 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)a, letter, Douglas to McKerracher, April 5, 1960.
69 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)a, cabinet minute no. 9856 with attached treasury
board minutes, February 16, 1960. SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, Douglas to M.E. Yahnolnitsky
(Secretary, Yorkton Branch of the SCMHA), January 13, 1961.
70 Dooley, “The Politics of Deinstitutionalization,” p. 9.
71 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)a, McKerracher to Douglas, March 22, 1960. SAB, Erb
Papers, R-34, 172G3, letter, Saskatchewan Psychiatric Nurses Association (Secretary-Treasurer) to
Erb, March 14, 1960.
72 Erb gave two reasons for the government turning down the relatively modest $10,000 request: 1) it
would require overturning the policy of not providing financial assistance to established
organizations (the SCMHA had received funding from the provincial government until 1956); and
2) if the money were granted “it would mean that some project under the Psychiatric Services
Branch of my department would have to be reduced or abandoned.” SAB, Erb Papers, R-34,
172A1, letter, Erb to F.E.R. Badham (SCMHA President), January 14, 1960.
73 F.H. Kahan, Brains and Bricks: The History of the Yorkton Psychiatric Centre (Regina: White Cross
Publications on behalf of the Saskatchewan Division, Canadian Mental Health Association, 1965),
p. 177.
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In early October 1960, the government suddenly announced that the
weakening provincial economy and the deteriorating state of provincial
revenues required that it postpone the Yorkton project for one year.74 In
a single stroke, the CCF government eliminated whatever goodwill it
might have generated in the mental health community just months
before. As might be expected, SCMHA members felt that the government
was now showing its true colours.75
Erb tried to control the damage by reassuring the SCMHA and other
interested parties that the government would use the $500,000 to construct
the laundry, food, and other auxiliary service facilities that would be
shared between the existing Yorkton municipal hospital and the proposed
psychiatric hospital.76 But by the end of 1960, the government halted con-
struction work, having received no word from Ottawa as to whether the
project had qualified for hospital construction grant. To reduce expec-
tations, Douglas told the Yorkton Branch of the SCMHA that the future
of the facility would be “entirely dependent on the availability of
funds.”77 This was followed by an announcement in the Throne Speech
that construction of the Centre would be halted until funds were available,
which prompted the SCMHA to demand what circumstances would be
required for construction to continue. Moreover, if the Saskatchewan
Plan was the priority the government claimed, why could it not delay
one of its other capital projects and divert the money to the Yorkton
Psychiatric Centre? The SCMHA went on to dismiss the government’s
actions on mental health as merely “palliative.”78
74 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, letter, Erb to F.E.R. Badham (SCMHA President) October 7, 1960.
It appears that the announcement occurred at approximately that same time as cabinet delegation
day for the SCMHA (October 4, 1960): SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 572 (14-26), cabinet
memorandum (cabinet minute no. 226), H.S. Lee to cabinet members delegated to meet with
SCMHA, September 12, 1960, with handwritten note on minute indicating that Erb had arranged
for the date and time, and that while T.C. Douglas “not on committee he may wish to sit in.”
75 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, letter, F.B. Roth (Deputy Minister of Public Health) to Erb, October
19, 1960.
76 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, letter, F.E.R. Badham to Erb, November 2, 1960.
77 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, letter, Douglas to M.E. Yaholnitsky (Secretary, Yorkton Branch,
SCMHA), January 13, 1961. In addition (letter, Clarke, President, SCMHA Yorkton Branch, to
Erb, February 21, 1961) the SCMHA claimed that the government’s decision has done
irreparable harm to its annual fundraising campaign, one of the objectives of which was to help
fund the move to community-based mental health. In 1959, the SCMHA had raised $73,078 in its
provincial campaign, 90 percent of the organization’s operating revenues: SAB, Canadian Mental
Health Association Papers, R-327, 1.61, SCMHA Ninth Annual Report, 1960, financial statement
for the year ended December 31, 1959.
78 SAB, Erb Papers, R-34, 172G3, letter, Badham (President, SCMHA) to Douglas, February 24, 1961.
In response, Douglas argued that his government’s per capita expenditures on mental health were
the highest in Canada. He assured the SCHMA that the Saskatchewan Plan was among his
government’s highest priorities and that he intended to proceed with the construction of the
Yorkton Psychiatric Centre and other community-based psychiatric hospitals “at the earliest date
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As this exchange occurred, the Advisory Planning Committee on
Medicare (the Thompson Committee) was simultaneously conducting
hearings on the government’s proposed medicare scheme. In the highly
publicized hearings, the SCMHA joined with the College of Physicians
and Surgeons and the business lobbies in criticizing the government,
arguing that it should implement the Saskatchewan Plan before launching
a new insurance program.79 The College gave support to the SCMHA and
the Saskatchewan Plan, arguing that the “treatment of the mentally ill in
our institutions constitutes a travesty of a basic public responsibility.”
Likewise, the Saskatoon Board of Trade, claimed that the government
should implement the Saskatchewan Plan before it considered medicare,
because the “mentally ill, who comprise a significant percentage of all
those requiring medical care in Saskatchewan, are receiving very unfair
consideration.”80
Throughout 1961, the SCMHA criticized the government for halting
construction on the Yorkton project. On August 4, 1961, Douglas was
acclaimed leader of the national NDP and announced that he would
resign as premier of Saskatchewan in November. Douglas wanted medi-
care implemented before he left provincial politics, but organized medi-
cine used every delay tactic possible to prevent the Thompson
Committee from submitting a final report. By September 1961, the
Thompson Committee had only submitted a majority interim report,
delaying the introduction of the medicare bill for first reading in the legis-
lature to October.81 That same month, Abram Hoffer, the PSB’s research
director, had begun a major letter writing campaign orchestrated by the
SCMHA to pressure the government to resume constructing the
Yorkton psychiatric facility. As the SCMHA saw it, “if the Government
did not build the centre before medicare, it would never build it”
because of the “great sums of money” that would “be involved in the
scheme.”82
Lawson not only supported the SCMHA’s campaign against the govern-
ment, he was suspected by many of feeding information to opposition
members who were taking full advantage of the anti-medicare coalition
to attack the government on its medicare bill.83 In October, as the
SCMHA launched its letter writing campaign, Lawson spoke openly in
possible, consistent with” its “financial resources and other responsibilities (Douglas to Badham,
March 1, 1961).”
79 Kahan, Brains and Bricks, pp. 117–119.
80 Selections from briefs quoted in Kahan, Brains and Bricks, p. 119.
81 Johnson, Dream No Little Dreams, pp. 267–269.
82 Kahan, Brains and Bricks, p. 131.
83 SAB, Douglas Papers, R-33.1, XIV 554 (14-8)c, letter, A. Hoffer to Douglas, March 16, 1961. Hoffer
defended Lawson but he strongly supported Lawson in his Saskatchewan Plan campaign against the
government.
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a meeting of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, publicly accusing the
CCF government of “duplicity and immorality” for the manner in which it
had dealt with the Saskatchewan Plan explaining that “[a]fter six years of
effort and frustration there has not been any acceptance by the govern-
ment of the plan nor has even one unit been constructed.” He then
stated that politicians “have an entirely different sense of values from
what we [physicians] have” and, suggesting that medicare was little
more than a cheap political gambit, “[t]o them the vote is all important.”84
When these statements were reported in the newspaper the next day, Erb
told Douglas that Lawson had “gone beyond all limits of conduct that can
be tolerated” and that he would fire him at the conclusion of the current
session of the legislature.85
Immediately after Douglas departed, his successor Woodrow Lloyd
shuffled his cabinet. William G. Davies was appointed minister of public
health while Erb was made minister of public works, a demotion. For
some time, Erb had been viewed as a weak minister, and Lloyd wanted
a stronger politician at the helm while the government implemented med-
icare against the strenuous objection of the doctors and the other powerful
members of the anti-medicare coalition.86 Lawson was not fired, presum-
ably because of the government’s desire not to further damage its deterior-
ating relationship with the SCMHA, and its single-minded focus on the
battle with the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan that
ultimately culminated in a 23-day doctors’ strike in July 1962.87
The Lloyd government was prepared to go further to neutralize the
SCMHA in the medicare battle. On March 5, 1962, Davies announced
in the legislature that construction on the Yorkton Psychiatric Centre
would recommence. In addition, the government would also work with
the SCMHA in building a psychiatric research centre in Saskatoon,
news that would also please Hoffer and the PBS. At the same time, the
health minister took the opportunity to vigorously defend the govern-
ment’s record in mental health and attack the “rather irresponsible state-
ments made about the [government’s] mental health program” in the past.
The government paid for the construction of the Yorkton Psychiatric
Centre as a winter works project so work did not begin until the end of
the year. Built at a cost of $2.5 million, almost double the PSB’s original
estimate, the Centre was finally opened in October 1963.88
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Epilogue and Conclusion
In 1964, the CCF government that had been in power for twenty years was
defeated. The new Liberal government under premier Ross Thatcher con-
tinued the PSB’s policy of deinstitutionalization, and actually accelerated
the emptying of the two mental hospitals in an effort to save money. In
shifting the locus of care from the mental hospitals to community care,
the Thatcher government also continued with a very modified version of
the Saskatchewan Plan – so modified, that it bore little resemblance
to the original PSB plan though the label continued to be used by
Lawson’s successors.89 The SCMHA lost much of its influence as well as
its membership in the 1960s, largely because of its difficulty in accepting
the new version of the Saskatchewan Plan.
Lawson remained PSB director until his retirement in 1965. According
to psychiatric historian John Mills, Lawson’s rigidity in terms of his particu-
lar vision of community psychiatry combined with the “obduracy” of the
SCMHA, contributed to the failure of the original plan, and the decline
of the influence of the SCMHA in the 1960s.90 The Lawson-SCMHA
dream of a publicly-delivered system of hospitals and outpatient clinics,
staffed by publicly-employed PSB psychiatrists, nurses, and social
workers, was never achieved. In its place, private practitioners – both
family doctors and psychiatrists – working in private clinics, provided
the bulk of primary mental health care and treatment, while psychiatric
wards in general hospitals provided acute care, and patients suffering
from chronic mental conditions were still sent to the psychiatric hospital
North Battleford (the Weyburn hospital was closed in 1971) if their con-
ditions could not be managed through drug therapy and regular contact
with a family physicians and consulting psychiatrist. Ultimately, it was
the “private practice, public payment” policy of medicare that facilitated
this approach to mental health service delivery, with psychiatrists leaving
the employ of government bodies such as the PSB of the department of
the public health to establish private practices with governments paying
patient bills through medicare.91
The Saskatchewan Plan as originally conceived by the PSB assumed a
world without medicare, one in which psychiatrists would remain in the
employ of government, and provide inpatient psychiatric services in
eight regional psychiatric hospitals, and use these hospitals as the base
89 Lafave, Stewart, and Grunberg, “Community Care of the Mentally Il.” Barbara L. Moss-Herjanic
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90 Mills, “Lessons from the Periphery,” p. 192.
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to provide outpatient services. Even before medicare was implemented in
Saskatchewan, however, this original vision was being altered by the gov-
ernment because of the policy regime insisted upon by the Government of
Canada through its hospital grants and in its introduction of cost-sharing
for a national system of universal hospital insurance. Self-standing psychia-
tric hospitals were not eligible for cost-sharing but psychiatric wards in
general hospitals were, largely based on a distinction between chronic
care – which was perceived, falsely, as the predominant concern of even
the new psychiatric hospitals proposed by the PSB – and acute care in
general hospitals. Although lethal to the Saskatchewan Plan as originally
conceived, even within this policy regime (as recognized by Griff
McKerracher), it was more than possible to shift from old-style psychiatric
care to a more community-based system of mental health care, something
that the CCF government commenced and a subsequent Liberal govern-
ment achieved.
Finally, as sociologist Harley Dickinson surmises, there is a strange par-
allelism between the asylum movement of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century and the community mental health movement of the postwar
era. At their essence, both were based more on ideological claims or
beliefs than on hard evidence. The asylum movement asserted as a self-
evident truth the therapeutic quality of rural settings, segregated from
the complications, confusion, and noise of regular urban life.92
Vigorously attacking the isolation of the asylums and mental hospitals,
the community mental health movement asserted in its place the commu-
nity, “an almost mystical entity, exposure to which was thought to cure
mental illness.”93
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